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Abstract
The author analyses the growing importance of IRL against the background 
of a changing European society. Based on sociological research, the traditional 
status of the Christian religion - and the monoreligious education that normally 
accompanies it - is seriously being challenged by the process of secularisation 
and the growing plurality or religious attitudes and beliefs among people in the 
West. Europe has become a complex network of infl uences that constitute the 
actual symbolic fi eld employed by people in their search for truth. The interest for 
religion is still very much alive. People are not endlessly indifferent but still hope 
to fi nd (religious) truth and meaning, even if this process has become much more 
complex today. In this context, interreligious dialogue itself becomes a religious 
act. The status given by a religion to other religions is of crucial importance for its 
ultimate credibility. In this line of thought, religious education should transcend 
both a purely monoreligious approach and a purely objective-comparative 
(multireligious) approach, and instead should cultivate in the pupils - at the very 
borderlands of the different religious, cultural and geo-political territories - an 
attitude of practising interreligious dialogue as a religious event.
Keywords
Status of religion, laïcité-secularity, religious indifference, interreligious 
dialogue, interreligious learning.
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1. Introduction
According to surveys and concrete experiences at the grass-roots level, mono-
religious education is being placed under pressure by the growing secularisation 
and plurality of Western Europe. Due to the growing diversifi cation of identities 
among the faithful, even within the same tradition, the religious fi eld itself 
becomes complex and obscure. Reminding one of Rahner’s description of the 
major phases of the church’s history, Waldenfels comments upon the emergence 
of a polycentric world church in the second half of the twentieth century. As 
a result, the churches reconsider the role that they can play in contemporary 
society in interaction with other religions and new religious movements1.
The difference with the prevalence of a worldwide missionary proclamation 
of the Christian faith, and of the exclusive interpretation of the universal salvation 
of all people in Christ is obvious. The Christian Tradition being the norm, other 
religions were always evaluated from within that tradition. The hope for unity with 
other religions was formulated from the Christian perspective. Today, however, 
given the outspoken worldwide communication, the multiplicity of religious 
creeds and models of religious behaviour heightens the need for appropriate 
criteria and critical discernment of the truth-value, function, legitimisation, 
meaning, and relevance of religions. During the past two centuries, the religious 
traditions and their social position in society have been severely criticised2. 
Of course, the critique of religion, or Religionskritik, in an intra-ecclesial or 
extra-ecclesial perspective, directly or indirectly parallels the changes religious 
traditions experience as the result of their confrontation with other traditions3. 
But the widespread sceptical attitude of modern thinking in the Western world, 
Europe in particular, and the rational examination of religious behaviour by the 
human sciences have a deep impact upon the perception of religion by the public, 
and upon the way religions present themselves.
It is particularly this change in self-presentation and perception that needs to 
be looked at when launching IRL (Interreligious Learning) as a core paradigm 
1 H. Waldenfels, Wandlungen in der Beurteilung und Kritik nichtchristlicher Religionen durch 
das Christentum aus katholischer Sicht, in: H.R. Schlette (ed.), Religionskritik in interkultureller 
und interreligiöser Sicht, Bonn 1998, Borengässer, p. 27-34.
2 J. A. van der Ven, Kontingenz und Religion in einer säkularisierten und multikulturellen 
Gesellschaft, in: H.-G. Ziebertz, J. A.van der Ven (eds), Religiöser Pluralismus und interreligiöses 
Lernen, Kampen 1994, Kok Pharos, p. 15-37.
3 H. R. Schlette, Einleitung, in: H.R. Schlette (ed.), Religionskritik in interkultureller und 
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for religious education. According to this assumption, one may put the focus 
upon ‘dialogue’, conversation, communication, learning, or upon the changing 
relationship between the different religious traditions. Religions, however do not 
exist in a vacuum. They are constituted by the context in which they emerged or 
were introduced. What religions concretely represent in these contexts and what 
religions say about themselves are the results of the outcome of an interaction with 
their environment. As the terms and content of these interactions are changing, 
what religion stands for is also a changing reality4. For van der Ven, religion 
itself is a contingent reality5. The plurality of Christian beliefs and world religions 
stresses the contingent dimension despite the universal meaning attributed to Gods 
salvation. Hence the question: what is the social standing, or status, of religions in 
a particular situation?6 And what are its implications for interreligious learning?
Besides the many questions to be raised about what IRL stands for in principle, 
as spelled out in the introductory of this book, the transition from mono-religious 
education to IRL is not evident from an institutional, educational, or legal point 
of view. As the questions suggest, nearly all the aspects of the institutional setting 
of RE are affected and need to be reconsidered. The different components of 
the possible specifi c domain of IRL largely depend upon contextual and shifting 
circumstances. The distinct actors committed to IRL or those involved in its 
implementation echo different interests and represent a mixture of institutional and 
educational responsibilities. In fact, IRL suggests that, given the circumstances of 
religious plurality, teachers now have to work with an open situation whereby the 
subjects themselves, in the context of a formal curriculum, play an important role 
in the choice of the content to be explored.
2. Interreligious Learning in its Systemic Context
The recent emergence of the outspoken and offi cially recognised interest for 
ecumenism and open relationships with non-Christian religions is inherently 
related to the changes of Western European society. Hence, to consider religions 
in their social context is important for seeing more clearly the impact of the social 
4 J. A. Beckford, Th. Luckmann (eds.), The Changing Face of Religion, London 1989, Sage, 
p. 1; G. Ward, Cultural transformation and Religious Practice, Cambridge 2005, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 62ff.
5 J. A. van der Ven, Kontingenz und Religion, op. cit., p. 27-32.
6 H. Lombaerts, D. Pollefeyt (eds.), Hermeneutics and Religious Education, Leuven 2004, 
Peeters, p. 12-15.
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standing of religions upon IRL. The following four different perspectives will be 
taken into consideration:
- the historical perspective
- the geo-political perspective
- the rational interpretation of religious beliefs and behaviour
- the theological debates and interreligious dialogue.
3. Historical Perspective
Modernity is generally seen as the dynamic force of fundamental changes 
in Western European society. Primarily, Modernity detached freedom from 
a specifi c context and from religious traditions. Freedom then claims autonomy, 
sets its own unconditional and defi nitive laws, controls all of the institutions, and 
constitutes the basis of the self-assured human being. The pre-modern certainties 
and frames of reference collapsed and lost their credibility. A withered tradition 
is not granted authority in modern society.
Although being one of the main instigators of the emancipation process proper 
to modernity, the Christian churches experienced fundamental diffi culties in 
dealing with the outcome of Modernity. For example, the so-called secularisation 
and theological proposal to recognise the correlation between human reality 
and the Christian faith still meet with a lot of resistance in the pastoral and 
doctrinal fi eld. Although defending the individual person and religious freedom, 
too often over the past centuries the churches went along with modernity in 
opposing its main options or in entrenching itself in intra-ecclesial matters, and, 
as a consequence, began losing its grip upon society. But, when the churches are 
opposing each other as modern society sometimes claims and when religions are 
no longer relevant in public life, do they still have an autonomous, independent 
core, which has the authority to challenge the political or cultural assumptions 
propagated in an open society?7.
The importance of the confl icts related to attributing an absolute priority to 
freedom in modern society is clearly discernable in two processes that are at the 
centre of multiple debates today: who has what kind of authority over religion 
in society? (the laïcité-debate), and do Europeans tend to eradicate religions 
root and branch, as some seem to argue? (the issue of religious indifference). 
The remarkable changes of the concept of laïcité over the past decades and the 
changing interest for religion are two infl uential factors for IRL.
7 W. Kasper, L’Eglise et les processus modernes de la liberté, “Istina” 49 (2004), p. 115-123.
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4. The Laïcité-Secularity Debate
Many a representation of the French Revolution and of the separation between 
Church and State associates laïcité with a negative, anti-clerical, anti-religion 
political strategy. Philipp Portier calls it the “laïcité primitive”8. Historically 
speaking, in Europe, laïcité is to be situated at the heart of the development of 
Christianity9. In the 16th – 17th centuries, the secular, civil authority instituted 
itself in order to achieve a juridical policy of pacifi cation among Catholics and 
Protestants10. By recognising that the political unity was unreachable without 
religious peace, a new perspective emerged in the name of civil coherence. A new 
lay mindset went along with a new religious mindset; both ways of approaching 
the social reality were interdependent and necessary to keep the systems in 
harmony. The close interconnectedness between a Catholic absolutist monarchy 
and the Church in the Ancien Régime had become a major abuse and was placing 
the whole of society at risk. In the relationship of the new society and issue of 
freedom, people faced new questions: what does it mean to live according to 
one’s personal convictions, be they secular or religious convictions, in a political 
system which claims its own authority, independently of what each individual 
believes? At once, a ‘secular philosophy’ called the tradition, a well established 
‘Catholic, or Christian philosophy’, to clarify its main theological assumptions in 
response to the alternative, mere secular model of construction of a new social 
reality11.
Laïcité was then the result of political wisdom, a subtle sense of balance, which 
does not force anybody to give up personal convictions, but rather introduces 
a new art of living together12. Laïcité represents a double memory: the history 
of a legal process of putting things into a new civic order, and the history of 
a social process of secularisation. Institutions are separated and secularised, but 
the religious cults are respected as regards to their proper and specifi c aims. Or, as 
Charles De Gaulle put it: the State is secular, but France is Christian.
8 Ph. Portier, De la séparation à la reconnaissance. L’évolution du régime Français de laïcité, 
in: J.-P. Willaime, J.-R. Armogathe (eds.), Les mutations contemporaines du religieux, Turnhout 
2003, Brepols, p. 5.
9 B. Dupuy, La laïcité, principe de respect d’autrui et d’unicité nationale, “Istina” 49 (2004), 
p. 160-177.
10 Cf. e.g., the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the “religious peace” of Augsburg (1555), “the Edict 
of Nantes” (1598).
11 E. Poulat, Notre laïcité publique: La France est une République laïque (Constitutions de 1946 
et 1958), Paris 2003, Berg International, p. 295-302.
12 Ibid., p. 13.
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The harsh confrontation initiated by the French Revolution at the end of 
the 18th century between the new civil consciousness and absolutist aspirations 
for freedom, equality, fraternity, and the monopoly position of Christianity, the 
Catholic church in particular would take two centuries to establish a new peaceful 
order. Relying upon E. Poulat’s research, Philippe Portier distinguishes three main 
phases in the gradual “mutation” of the French laïcité, and recognises how in the 
wider European context different clusters of countries adopted similar policies in 
their dealings with the relationship between Church and State.
1/ The original principle of laïcité reached its most explicit form in the 
secularisation law of 1905: the total separation from the religious institution13. 
Freedom of conscience, privatisation of religious belonging, and the transcendence 
of the political domain were the most striking priorities.
2/ A new situation occurred with the plentiful reactions against the supremacy 
of the State (second half of the 20th century)14. The State was accused of 
exaggerated interferences with private matters of e.g. the Churches. In order to 
meet the protests and claims, the State organised policy committees, forums, and 
arenas. These were intended to take into account the sensitivities and aspirations 
of the different sections of a rapidly changing society. The State presented itself 
as co-operating with the law and was willing to subsidise all kinds of social 
projects, including the ones organised by the different religions. But, more 
importantly, the public space was constituted on the basis of the recognition of 
private identities15. The claim of second generation-migrants to enjoy ‘equality’ 
and republican citizenship (ethnicisation process) forced the State to integrate 
religious and cultural ‘differences’, beyond the original Jewish, protestant and 
catholic establishment. The principles of freedom, autonomy and self-realisation 
were extended in an unexpected and unforeseen way. Particular cultural and 
religious identities, including the Jewish-Christian tradition, were no longer 
seen as a danger or an obstacle to the common good of society. Historically, 
the original militant anti-religious or anti-clerical connotation of laïcité had been 
abandoned. In addition, the European Union, as a juridical entity is introducing 
a positive concept of freedom of religious belief, and is willing to recognise the 
public character of religious traditions16. Because there is no history, tradition or 
juridical rule set for these matters, the European Union is in fact a laboratory, 
13 Ph. Portier, De la séparation à la reconnaissance, op. cit., p. 5-6.
14 Ibid., p. 10ff.
15 Cf. also C. Taylor, K.A. Appiah, J. Habermas, A. Gutmann, Multiculturalis. Examining the 
Politics of Recognition, Princeton 1994, Princeton University Press, p. 25-73.
16 Ph. Portier, De la séparation à la reconnaissance, op. cit., p. 14.
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not only for granting a public space to a growing plurality of religions and 
religious movements, but for integrating the different legal systems and models 
of harmonising the interaction between State and Churches / religions. Indeed, 
besides the French experience with the process of secularisation (laïcité), 
other countries have a long-standing tradition of dealing with the same issue. 
Finland, Denmark, Greece and Great-Britain selected one denomination as 
the “national”, “dominant” or “State” religion, whereby a mutual penetration 
guaranteed harmony. Germany, Belgium, Italy and Spain adopted a fl exible 
separation between Church and State. Also, the traditional European churches 
adopted the democratic mindset more explicitly within their belief systems and 
ecclesial government. All European countries are confronted with the impact of 
non-catholic or non-Christian religions, religious minorities, and new religious 
movements. The French society cannot stop or ignore the impact of the European 
context. However, as J.-P. Willaime commented, the new face of a pluri-religious 
Europe has not been shaped yet17.
3/ But the real ‘reform’ or fundamental mutation became obvious during 
the past decade, partly as the result of (ethical) initiatives of Christian churches 
in the public domain. The French State is now welcoming religions within the 
public realm; looking for synergy, rather than exclusion, for a harmony between 
unity and plurality, equality and alterity, the public and the private18. We now 
recognise a benevolent and sympathetic kind of laïcité. The State is willing to 
take far reaching fi nancial responsibilities for schools, cultural institutions, public 
buildings, irrespective of their religious or ideological background. The school, 
for example is perceived as a space for life and immanence, open to religious and 
cultural differences, enabling the free speech of students, permitting absenteeism 
for religious reasons and setting the rules for externalised religious symbols. The 
State opts for a laïcité d’intelligence, an open, cooperative, understanding kind 
of secular mindset. Thus, religions now are granted by the State to participate 
in a new way in the public life. The representatives are invited to cooperate for 
special missions or to participate in the ethical/political discernment of crucial 
issues or dilemmas.
The transition of the status of religion in society, in France, is a remarkable 
historical adventure19. The civil authorities attributed a new juridical and 
social position to the churches. It took the churches a long time to change 
17 J.-P. Willaime, Conclusion, in: J.-P. Willaime & J.-R. Armogathe, Les mutations contemporaines 
du religieux, op. cit., p. 128.
18 Ph. Portier, De la séparation à la reconnaissance, op. cit., p. 17ff.
19 E. Poulat, Notre laïcité publique, op. cit., p. 373-381.
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the representation they had of their role in society. But, helped by the new 
Constitutions, they gradually saw the new social and public space given to them, 
and to grant themselves specifi c and relevant responsibilities in that new context. 
From a unitary concept of truth and the absolutist, centralised authority attributed 
to ‘God’s will’, the churches had to integrate the concepts of ‘religious freedom’, 
‘freedom of individual conscience’, and ‘freedom of cultic celebrations’. They 
gradually came to understand and appreciate the public status of ‘cultural 
association’, as a juridical guarantee for having a social identity, and for organising 
specifi c activities. The recognition of personal freedom allowed diversity to be 
recognised on constitutional and juridical grounds. From hierarchical dependency, 
people were introduced into the logic of the ‘social contract’. The French type of 
laïcité introduced a generalised system of public freedom for all.
Of course, the mutation of the laïcité refl ects the mutation of democracy. 
A democracy of subsidiary and delegation represents the polyphony of subjective 
identities, which, for Philippe Portier, raises the question whether such an open 
society will be able to function well without universalistic ambitions20.
In summary, Jean-Paul Willaime recognises four major traits in the mutations 
of the relationship between society (Modernity), Church, and State21. 1/ the 
mutation of the religious fi eld, related to the mutation of the political domain, 
results in a new understanding of laïcité, in terms of partnership between Church 
and State; the States now appreciate the role of churches and religions in a new 
way; 2/ the religious traditions change and transform themselves through their 
interactions with modernity; mutations are happening within the religious 
traditions; 3/ the impact of the mondialisation and globalisation processes upon 
the religious domain should not be underestimated; 4/ growing individualisation 
is an undeniable trait of religious people in our ultra-modern society.
As a major consequence of these processes, the church now has a more 
outspoken symbolic status in European civil society. Being part of the post-
Christian era, the churches have to situate themselves in a different way. 
Because of their specifi c ecclesial convictions, the symbolic space offers 
them opportunities for challenging the social, cultural, and political reality, 
for refl ecting and acting in the name of a less ambiguous institutional position 
in society. As E. Poulat asserts, to change the public status of religion is, of 
course, the result of a juridical reform, but it inseparably refl ects a cultural 
20 Ph. Portier, De la séparation, op. cit., p. 24.
21 J.-P. Willaime, Conclusion, in: J.-P. Willaime & J.-R. Armogathe, Les mutations contemporaines 
du religieux, op. cit., p. 125.
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revolution as well, with implications for all institutions in society22. Obviously, 
such a fundamental reversal, with its most recent further developments, has far 
reaching implications for religious education in the Christian communities, as 
well as in (public) schools.
5. The “Religious Indifference” Symptom23
According to the Pontifi cal Council for Culture (Plenary assembly, Rome, 
March 11-13, 2004), “religious indifference and a growing ‘religion of the self’ 
pose a greater challenge to the church than atheism and its denial of the existence 
of God”. The arguments for this kind of diagnosis are inspired by the fi ndings of 
a world-wide survey. Today, more people than twenty years ago admit that they 
do not belong to any particular religion, and more people stopped practicing. 
This would be more the case among young adults than among senior men and 
women24. As cardinal Poupard, the president of the Pontifi cal Council observed, 
the “militant and organized atheism” of the Communist era has been replaced 
by “practical indifference, the loss of interest in the question of God, and the 
abandonment of religious practices - especially in the Western world”25. The 
cardinal remarked: “The era most menacing to man is not the one that denies the 
truth, but the one that is not concerned about truth26.
In 1983, Mgr Poupard, then Pro-President of the Secretariat for the Non-
Believers, presented an interdisciplinary study about ‘religious indifference’27. 
In the Foreword, he underscored the importance of studying the issue from 
different angles28. Indeed, ‘indifference’ used to be a key word in Christian 
spirituality, a basic condition for being committed to Gods will. In that sense, 
22 E. Poulat, Notre laïcité publique (n. 12), p. 22.
23 H. Lombaerts, Różnorodność czy obojętność? Indyferentyzm religijny jako symptom 
przemian (The difference/indifference dilemma. “Religious Indifference” re-examined as symptom 
of a mutation), “Katecheta” 48 (2004) Nr 7, p. 4-16.
24 Survey on ‘non belief and religious indifference’ carried out by Pontifi cal Council for Culture 




27 Secrétariat pour les non-croyants, L’indifférence religieuse, Paris 1983 (Rome 1978, Italian 
text). In 1983 the International Review of Theology, “Concilium” also published an issue on 
‘religious indifference’.
28 Ibid., p. 5-6.
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it had a positive connotation. The Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the 
development of modern, secularised society, on the contrary, initiated attitudes 
against the established religious traditions, institutions, doctrines, and religious 
practices. Various authors of this study elucidate the links between the evolution 
of civil society (e.g. secularisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, emigration) 
and religious indifferentism. Religious indifference is then diagnosed as having 
a negative, destructive impact upon people as regards to their religious attitudes 
and affi liations29.
For Gaudium et Spes, atheism30 was still considered as the main challenge 
for the church. The main reason for atheism being that those not following the 
dictates of their conscience shut out God and try to dodge religious questions. 
“The remedy which must be applied to atheism, however, is to be sought in 
a proper presentation of the Church’s teaching as well as in the integral life of the 
Church and her members”31. In the Constitution, ‘religious indifference’ was not 
even mentioned32.
In its negative sense the complaints about religious indifference have been 
formulated since the seventeenth century, and it was a main issue of concern 
throughout the eighteenth, the nineteenth, and well into the twentieth centuries33. 
Preachers, for example, blamed people who came to listen to the Word of God 
without interest; they were accused of being ‘indifferent’. In their writings Pascal 
29 Cf. the contributions of G. Cottier, L. Mozart, G. De Rosa in “Concilium” 1983.
30 In n° 19, the Constitution lists a variety of responses people may experience in relationship to 
God and to religion, mainly associated with the word ‘atheism’: denial, agnosticism, meaninglessness 
of God and religion, relativism, misinformation, engrossment in earthly affairs. “Modern atheism…
stretches the desires for human independence to such a point that it poses diffi culties against any 
kind of dependence on God.” On the other hand, it “anticipates the liberation of man especially 
through his economic and social emancipation. “Some never get to the point of raising questions 
about God, since they seem to experience no religious stirrings nor do they see why they should 
trouble themselves about religion”.
31 Ibid., n° 21; Cf. also bishop Grab (Chur), President of the Council of European Bishops 
Conferences, on the occasion of the pilgrimage of European bishops to Santiago de Compostella 
(2004): despite its own weaknesses and failures, the Roman Catholic Church has to address the 
moral decadence and religious indifference, which seems to control Europe at the moment, with 
a powerful proclamation.
32 B. Mondin associates the descriptive approach to atheism, in: Gaudium et Spes, with religious 
indifference. He then continues: “religious indifference is perhaps-many people are inclined to 
think so today-the most widespread and, from some standpoints, the most serious form of unbelief”, 
“L`Osservatore Romano”, Weekly Edition in English, 27 July 1978, p. 9.
33 E. Poulat, Quand nous parlons d’indifférence…, “Catéchèse” (1984), Juillet, p. 9-17.
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(1623-1662)34 and Bossuet (1627-1704)35 reacted vehemently against atheists, 
deists, free thinkers, ‘Libertins’36, Quietists37, a worldly attitude separated from 
religion, or against tolerance towards Protestantism.
The famous essay of the French priest, F.R. de La Mennais, had a deep impact 
because his book (two volumes) marked a passage from indifference to religion 
(seventeenth century) to indifference between religions (nineteenth century)38. 
According to La Mennais, it is not that easy to be ‘indifferent’ in religious matters. 
Indifference, understood as a permanent attitude of the soul is contradictory to 
the human nature, and destroys the human person in essence39. He identifi es 
three systems of indifference, the fi rst one of which states that all religions are 
indifferent; religion is a political organisation, necessary for the people only40. 
Religious indifference was thus perceived as a mental system, an argued way 
of thinking with universal aspirations, and was identifi ed as ‘indifferentism’. 
Religious indifferentism was condemned as an error, heresy and sin41.
When today a growing number of people admit not to belong to a particular 
religion, they do not necessarily lack interest in religions or life visions. 
“Religious indifference” is too massive a diagnosis, which is contradicted by 
34 B. Pascal, L. Lafuma, Pensées, Paris 1978, Seuil, p. 427-429, p. 181-191; D. Wetsel, Pascal 
and Disbelief. Catechism and Conversion in the Pensées, Washington 1994, Catholic University of 
America Press, p. 49-129, 327ff.
35 J.-B. Bossuet, Oeuvres complètes, textes établis et annotés par l’abbé Velat - Y. Champailler, 
Paris 1961, Gallimard; Cf. also G. Cottier, Les fondements de l’indifférence en philosophie de la 
religion, in L’indifférence religieuse, Le Point Théologique 41, p. 44ff.
36 ‘Libertins’ (seventeenth century) were originally dissidents of protestant sects in the North of 
France; later it was also associated with a literary movement. The Libertins are identifi ed with an 
irreligious mindset, refusing revelation, adopting free interpretation of Scriptures, negating sin.
37 Quietism (Miguel de Molina, 17th century) states that perfection is achieved in full passivity; 
the soul rests in Gods presence. Ascetic practices are superfl uous. Quietism is related to every 
mystical orientation, which minimises the human activity. Quietism was condemned by Innocentius 
XI in 1687.
38 F. R. de Lamennais, Essai sur l’indifférence en matière de religion, Ducasse, Paris 1834, 2 v. 
Cf. also C. Marechal, La Mennais, la dispute de l’Essai sur l’indifférence d’après des documents 
nouveaux et inédits, Paris 1925, Champion.
39 D. E. Lamennais, Essai sur l’indifférence en matière de religion, op. cit., p. 37.
40 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 53ff. Cf. also C. Marechal, La Mennais, op. cit., p. 2ff.
41 “Indifferentism equalizes all religions, and gives equal rights to truth and error.” (Cardinal 
Manning); indifferentism is “a heresy consisting in an unconcern for any particular creed, provided 
the morals be right and good” (Gregory XVI). See M. Vos, Encyclical On liberalism and religious 
indifferentism of Pope Gregory XVI - August 15, 1832; Cf. also the Encyclical Pascendi Domini 
Gregis by Pius X, 1907; Cf. also D. Concina (O.P.) – C. E. Re della Sardegna, Della religione 
rivelata contra gli ateisti, deisti, materialisti, indifferentisti, che negano la verita de misteri, libri 
cinque, Venezia 1754, presso Simone Occhi, p. 2-3, 281ff.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 1 (2011) Number 232
the careful study of the results of surveys of the past forty years. The so-called 
‘religious indifference’ diagnosis reveals a misunderstanding. The unitary truth 
and centralised authority in the Catholic church are perceived as the exclusive 
category for evaluating and diagnosing people’s religiosity, based upon a linear 
understanding of the link between proclamation / teaching of the Church’s 
doctrine, and the obedient response of the faithful through liturgy, moral and 
doctrinal observance. In reality, the ‘reception’ of what is offered by the pastoral 
ministers leads to the construction of a personal faith response, for which the 
believer is responsible, and thus by itself ends up in an unforeseeable diversity 
among the faithful. When the responses differ from the standardised and 
expected behaviour, it does not mean that people reject religiosity as such, or 
stop being related to a particular faith tradition. Rather, ‘religious indifference’ 
is a symptom of a shift occurring in the religious consciousness of people in 
Western Europe and as noticed already, among certain groups of people in other 
continents. Sociologists and philosophers claim that, while it is an evolution 
proper to modern society, modernity itself is the result of the infl uence of 
Christianity upon Western society (Weber, e.g.). And thus, the present shift in 
religious attitudes, or ‘de-christianisation’, is another phase in the historical 
evolution of religions in the context of a globalised and complex modern society. 
Despite the highly diversifi ed attitudes of Europeans as regards to their religious 
traditions, surveys point out that the interest for religion and the search for truth 
is still alive and well.
6. The Geo-Political Perspective
According to Poupard’s survey, in the United States, atheism and non-belief 
are not increasing but there is a widespread dropping out of specifi c religious 
confessions. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America many people are still animated 
by popular religious piety at the heart of their respective cultures, says the 
report. In Africa and Latin America, more than non-belief, the main concern is 
a boom in sects and very active cults. China is still under the power of atheism 
like Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. In Asia the problem is not the absence 
of religion but a superimposition and complex coexistence of many different 
religions42. According to Cardinal Poupard, in Europe, there is a clear decline in 





The Impact of the Status of Religion in Contemporary Society upon Interreligious Learning
is renewed interest for religion in itself, with a swarm of new forms of pagan 
religiosity. The striking element in the description is the supposed link between 
geographical regions and political systems on the one hand, and the responses of 
its populations to Christianity and to other traditions or religious movements, on 
the other hand. A closer look at the European situation, for example may confi rm 
that religion is not in the fi rst place a matter of personal belief, but of belonging 
to a particular geo-political territory.
No doubt, religions played a decisive role in the construction of States and 
nations, of national, regional, social, and cultural identities. The territory conditions 
the religious belonging. Ireland, Poland, Lithuania, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Croatia, 
ex-Yugoslavia, are predominantly Catholic, Scotland is Presbyterian, England 
Anglican, Serbia, Greece and Russia are orthodox, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia 
are Lutheran, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, and Czech Republic are Catholic/
Protestant, Norway and Estonia agnostic, etc. Historically speaking, politics and 
religion were closely associated in the formation of the European continent. This 
situation suggests that, once a territory is linked to a particular religion, it is taken 
for granted that it will never change, because this link guarantees political, social 
and religious stability.
According to the European Values Studies and worldwide surveys, at fi rst 
glance, the geo-political maps of world religions are still valid. However, important 
shifts are to be studied for understanding how people today perceive and receive 
religion. In many regards, religious and spiritual boundaries no longer coincide 
with their traditional territories. The arrangement and complement of the world’s 
nations has altered during the twentieth century, due primarily to the demise 
of empires, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union. This process has 
affected religion profoundly. Ethnic and religious mixing has increased around the 
world43. Although loyalties remain between traditional religions and nationalism, 
a political unity is no longer linked with religious homogeneity (which means the 
end of cujus regio, ejus religio). Admittedly, still 75 % (of the population of 452 
million in the European Union of the 25 members) identifi es itself as Christian (in 
comparison to 85% in 1981): 55% Catholics (impact of Polish membership), 15% 
Protestants (29% in 1981), 5% Anglicans, 3% Orthodox Christians, besides 2,5% 
Muslims, 0,5% Jews, and 19% (other sources: 25%) who identify themselves 
‘without religion’ (13 % in 1981)44.
43 N. Smart, Atlas of the World’s Religions, Oxford 1999, Oxford University Press, p. 12-13.
44 J.-P. Willaime, Europe et religions. Les enjeux du XXIe siècle, Paris 2004, Fayard, p. 52-62.
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The situation differs considerably from country to country, as illustrated 
eloquently by the European Value Studies45. The evolution observed over the past 
decades reveals underlying fundamental shifts in the perception and reception of 
religious traditions. In 1999-2000, 77,4% of Europeans believe in God: Portugal 
94,4%, Ireland 95%, Greece 93,8 %, France61,5%, Sweden 53,4%, Holland 
61,1%. When the age factor is taken into consideration, the change becomes 
obvious. In Western Europe, in 1998, 85% of the 60-plus age group believe in God, 
in comparison to 68% of the18-24 group (30% in Holland, 47% in France). Other 
sources mention 72% of the British as ‘without religion’, 58% of the French, and 
21% of the Dutch population. When comparing the professed religious identity 
with religious practice, the situation is even more diversifi ed. In France, 61,5% 
of the population professes adherence to the Catholic Church, but only 7,6% 
practices (60,4% never go to any religious service). The religious practice rate 
is 56,9% in Ireland, 40,6% in Italy, 25,5% in Spain, 14,4% in Britain, 13,6% in 
Germany, 2,7% in Denmark.
In the 1960’s, various publications about the changes in religious behaviour 
in Europe suggested the secularisation process as the main cause, and predicted 
a further deterioration of institutionalised religions. The process, as was expected, 
would gradually affect other continents and cultures since, by all means they 
would absorb the European Modernity and Enlightenment ideals.
Today, the data is interpreted in a different way, particularly as regards the 
secularisation hypothesis, although the geo-political substructure still remains. 
According to the main thesis, Europe is “the exceptional case”46. In the fi rst 
place, in general, secularisation occurred in Western Europe. Peter Berger calls 
it ‘Eurosecularity’. But that process has not been repeated in other continents. 
In her book, G. Davie discusses the distinct structural patterns and the evolution 
of religious behaviour in the different continents. And in the second place, the 
observed secularisation refl ects a different reality than what was imagined some 
forty years ago47. Contrary to what he initially believed, P. Berger now asserts that 
religious pluralism does not necessarily lead to secularisation. “What pluralism 
does (…) is to undermine all taken-for-granted certainties, in religion as in all 
other spheres of life. But it is possible to hold beliefs and to live by them even if 
45 L. Halman, The European Values Study: a third wave: source book of the 1999/2000 
European Values Study Survey, Tilburg 2001, Tilburg University Faculty of Social and Behavioural 
Sciences.
46 G. Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World, London, 
Darton 2002, Longman and Todd.
47 P. Berger, Postscript, in: L. Woodhead (ed.), Peter Berger and the Study of Religion, London 
2001, Routledge, p. 194.
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they no longer hold the status of taken-for-granted verities”48.The main question 
then is to fi nd out what people in the European context are doing with religion, 
be they Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Moslem, etc. tradition? And, apart from 
the French story discussed in a previous paragraph, what social position do the 
political institutions and the populations at large give to religion in their private 
life, and in the public sphere, in the different European countries? As a result, how 
does it affect their self-perception and their mutual relationships? The study of 
the religious behaviour in Limerzel (a Catholic parish in Brittany, France), at the 
beginning of the twentieth century and at the end of the second millennium offers 
an eloquent illustration of the drastic changes which occurred and highlights a co-
existence of continuity and discontinuity and of the interrelatedness of the public 
and the private sphere49.
G. Davie is well known for her distinction of two typical characteristics of 
European religiosity. People vary in their way of maintaining the link between 
‘belonging’ and ‘believing’, or the institutional, ritualistic, orthodox aspect on 
the one hand, and the subjective, experienced, personal response, on the other 
hand50. ‘Belonging without believing’ (which Davie associates with ‘vicarious 
religion’) refers to a high percentage of religious conformity and institutional 
attachment, and to a low level of personal involvement or faith (e.g. Britain, 
Sweden). ‘Believing without belonging’ refers to a high concern with feelings and 
personal experiences among the believers, and to a low percentage of religious 
practice (e.g. France). The two situations cannot be evaluated in the same way, 
since the former group especially displays “an undeniable degree of secularisation 
throughout Western Europe”, while the latter group demonstrates considerable 
persistence51. The fi gures do not suggest an overall attitude of non-belief or 
indifference. Historical, as well as geo-political circumstances, and a diversifi ed 
‘logic’ of being a religious person explain this very particular situation. The 
perception of the value of a growing diversity of religious belonging is also 
shifting. The opinion that all religions have their value is becoming a wide spread 
option among the young generation. It represents the symptom of a mutation of 
contemporary religious attitudes. In 1994, 16% of the French sample declared: 
there is no ‘one true religion’. In 1998, only 4% in France, Britain and Germany 
48 Ibid., p. 194.
49 Y. Lambert, From Parish to Transcendent Humanism in France, in: J. A. Beckford – Th. 
Luckmann (eds), 
The Changing Face of Religion, op. cit., p. 49-63.
50 G. Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945. Believing without Belonging, Oxford 1994, 
Blackwell; G. Davie, Europe: The Exceptional case, op. cit., p. 5ff.
51 G. Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case, op. cit., p. 6-7.
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agreed with ‘the truth is in one religion’. What does the difference between 
the (statistical) patterns represent? A more careful observation, based upon the 
results of surveys, suggests changes in religious sensitivity, does not necessarily 
coincide with what is induced by ‘religious indifference’. Sociologists agree: 
churches in Europe continue to play an important role in society, despite the fact 
that less people practice their religion or profess the offi cial creeds. Issues related 
to religious freedom, to the differences and contrasts between Central, Eastern, 
and Western Europe52, or aspects of the cultural and religious majority-minority 
balance are other dimensions of the specifi cally European religious situation.
The plurality of Europe not only implies different religions: Catholics, 
Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Moslems, but also different life visions, 
like Greek philosophy, the Roman law, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, the French Revolution (separation of Church and State), the 
scientifi c mindset, different forms of humanism, etc. It is this complex network 
of infl uences that constitutes the symbolic fi eld of the search for truth.
People hope to reach that kind of truth, which makes a difference for their lives. 
The hope for truth is still based upon the multiple infl uences of a long-standing 
and complex European history. While these different infl uences are not necessarily 
antagonistic, they may well cooperate in a collective and purifying process of 
discernment. Inevitably, eclecticism does occur, with the related uncertainty as 
regards to personal identity. Traditional religions are no longer contained within 
the usual territorial institutional boundaries, structures, functions, and disciplines. 
While individual people are caught between individualisation and mondialisation, 
the intermediate structures for controlling religions and life visions are disturbed. 
One can understand Cardinal Poupard’s diagnosis and concerns when looking back 
at the comfortable monopoly of the Catholic Church. Other investigations don’t 
sound as pessimistic, pointing out that the denominational cultures (Catholicism, 
Protestantism, etc.) are more resistant than expected, in supporting collective 
identities.53 Many of the aspects of the present situation can easily be misread and 
misinterpreted, when isolated from the complexity of the context.
J.-P. Willaime underscores a remarkable move from the historical “monopoly 
of Christian religion” in Europe to the - juxtaposed - co-existence of Catholics, 
Protestants, Jews, Moslems, and secular life visions, and then to a new 
‘homogeneity of the religious sentiment’. For him, six characteristics can be 
52 D. Pollack, Religiousness Inside and Outside the Church in Selected Post-Communist 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, “Social Compass” 50 (2003), p. 321-334.
53 J. Astley, What Is Religion and Whose Faith Is It Anyway? Some Issues concerning the Nature 
and Normativity of Religion, and the Risks of Religious Education, in: H. Lombaerts, D. Pollefeyt 
(eds.), Hermeneutics and Religious Education, op. cit., p. 399-416.
37
Herman Lombaerts
The Impact of the Status of Religion in Contemporary Society upon Interreligious Learning
distinguished, which seem to be underlying the religious attitudes in Western 
Europe today54: (1) individualisation (do it yourself; compose your own religious 
identity); (2) subjectivisation (the importance of personal religious experiences); 
(3) aestheticisation (a feel for staging the religious event); (4) emotionalisation 
(religion of the heart, opposed to the formal institutional religion); (5) ethicisation 
(focus upon human rights and ecumenism); (6) ‘indifferentism’ (relative meaning 
of the different doctrinal traditions; pragmatic participation).
7. Rationality Perspective
The third component of the systemic context of interreligious learning that I 
would like to explore deals with the emerging impact of rationality in Western 
Europe, closely related to modernity, the Enlightenment, and the scientifi c 
mindset. As a result of the democratisation of education, three trends in the social 
environment seem to affect the established religious consciousness and culture 
of Western Europe. The compulsory school career for all young generations de-
sacralises the school; teachers and youngsters learn what ‘schooling’ is about in 
the fi rst place. The alertness proper to a critical approach to life, and the sceptical 
attitude as regards the usual ‘colonisation’ of the mind cultivate a pragmatic 
attitude preventing students from being infl uenced by doctrinal or speculative 
orientations.
True, the laïcité-debate today seems to have found its reasonableness. The 
State does not want to deny any longer the original, specifi c value of religious, 
philosophical or wisdom traditions for public life. Rather than highlighting 
a confl ict or competition of religious ambitions with the interests of the State, 
the main question now is to clarify the rational status of the fact that religious 
traditions do exist and continue to have infl uence upon people and upon society 
at large, including the political fi eld55. What is the ‘rational’ way of dealing with 
the ‘irrational’ dimension of life, and in what terms is modern society going 
54 J.-P. Willaime, Europe et religions, op. cit., p. 67.
55 In France, politicians, sociologists and philosophers alike use the expression “le phénomène 
religieux” or “le fait religieux” to identify a fi eld of public interest, independently of a possible personal 
involvement. For more information, documentation, and bibliography, cf. www.enseignement-
et-religions.org. (11.03.2011). Cf. also R. Debray, Rapport de mission - l’enseignement du fait 
religieux dans l’école laïque, février 2002 (http://www.education.gouv.fr/rapport/debray/default.
htm), and a critical reaction by J. Joncheray, Enseignement du fait religieux dans l’Ecole laïque 
(http://www.catho-theo.net/article.php3?id_article=23) (09.03.2011).
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to support and manage its institutionalisation?56 This component, I think has 
a decisive importance for introducing IRL into religious education.
Post-modern rationality of course differs from what is traditionally called ‘natural 
theology’, which tried to prove rationally the existence of (the Judeo-Christian) 
God. Natural theology had strong universalist pretensions, and throughout history 
used a great deal of violence and destructive policies for imposing its dogmatic 
system upon other cultures, religious traditions, or alternative interpretations. 
This kind of theology tended to overlook the unconscious, and not intentionally 
sought after logic behind the non-rational aspects of the non Judeo-Christian 
belief systems. But, the so-called primitive religious systems obviously have their 
own cognitive content and rational impact upon the social reality. Anthropology, 
ethnology, and philosophy contribute to altering the overall perspective of 
looking at the religious phenomenon in whatever cultural or historical context, 
distancing their approach from a (natural) theological intelligence. As regards to 
the philosophical approach, Minguelez recalls three alternative ways of dealing 
with the ‘rationality’ problem57.
Philosophical empiricism claims that neither do religious beliefs have a factual 
content nor are there any purely rational proofs for Gods existence. The empirical 
sciences provide the appropriate approach to study the persistence of religious 
traditions, despite a process of modernisation and secularisation.
Post-modern fi deism sees the religious fi eld as a pluralist game of languages 
(Wittgenstein), rather than as a rational or irrational phenomenon. Religion refers 
to the function of religious beliefs in the life of the believers, and cannot be 
evaluated from an external viewpoint. It has its own coherent wisdom about life, 
where ‘rationality’ has no real competence.
Calvinis reformed epistemology, on the other hand can be compared to the 
meaning attributed to the ‘individual’ in the neo-liberal society. Subjectivism, 
undetermined rationality, individualism, and vagueness suggest that every model 
of rationality is doomed to fail.
The problems related to rationality and religion are obvious: what kind of 
rationality offers a solid and reliable base for a philosophy of religious behaviour? 
Is there only one kind of rationality, and what are its forms and models? If a variety 
of forms of rationality have been used over time, what were the respective 
consequences for culture and society?58 We should not forget that, in the Western 
56 R. Minguelez, La philosophie des religions et la sociologie des religions, «Social Compass» 
49 (2002), p. 153-165.
57 Ibid., p. 157-161.
58 Ibid., p. 162.
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world (particularly Calvinist) Christianity contributed to the development of 
the capitalist system, and thus struggle for hegemony, for which the universal 
has a powerful strategic importance. Philosophers like Weber, Wittgenstein, and 
Habermas underscore the importance of a plurality of types of rationality. To 
recognise its relativity in critiquing the universalist pretension of the sciences 
of nature and the instrumentalist technological application of sciences would 
safeguard the real idea of rationality.
From a systemic point of view, Peter Beyer draws attention to the ‘offi cial’ 
meanings attributed to religion, besides its scientifi c (i.e. the Academy) and 
theological conceptions. His argument precisely deals with the social stand 
religions make in modern society. It is the basic social-systemic structure of 
modern and global society, which leads him to this typology, because “each 
approach has its characteristic logic(s) grounded in the institutional priorities of 
the respective social systems that typically generate them”59. According to him, 
there is ‘religiousness’ outside religion, i.e., not included within the boundaries 
of socially formed religions60. Besides scholars and theologians, he sees the need 
for others elaborating more arbitrary - conceptions of religion: ‘ordinary people’, 
institutional representatives, and offi cial centres of power (e.g., legal, political, 
educational, and mass-media systems). In modern society, a differentiated system 
for religion has developed and operates selectively. Beyer illustrates clearly in 
what sense different systems attribute different conceptions to religion, and thus 
grant religions a different social position a different status in society61. “How we 
conceive of religion depends on the social context or purpose we have for doing 
this”. The Academy as well as theologians would contest this point of view, and 
claim a more general, universalist conception of religion, which for Beyer may 
not be of much use. It is also more important to recognise that others deal with 
religion and have infl uence upon the scientifi c and theological discourse.
In the same line of thought, for Thomas Luckmann, in Western Europe, 
religion underwent an epoch-making change of its social forms. Particularly, 
the modern, privatised, social form of religion is “the absence of plausible and 
generally obligatory social models for the persisting universal human experience 
of transcendence and the search for a meaningful life”62.
59 P. Beyer, Conceptions of Religion. On Distinguishing Scientifi c, Theological, and “Offi cial” 
Meanings, “Social Compass” 50 (2003), p. 142-143.
60 Ibid., p. 153.
61 Ibid., p. 156.
62 Th. Luckmann, Transformations of Religion and Morality in Modern Europe, “Social 
Compass” 50 (2003), p. 282-283.
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In the actual discussion, ‘invisible religion’63 is taken up again to understand 
the most recent developments. Moving beyond the hypotheses of secularisation 
(i.e. the loss of authority of religious institutions), Luckmann suggests 
identifying the more complex processes of “institutional deregulation”64 of the 
act of believing. However, according to Luckmann, “religion is not a passing 
phase in the evolution of mankind but a universal aspect of the conditio 
humana. Appearing under different socio-structural conditions in various 
historical forms, it remains a constituent element of human life, bonding the 
individual human being, most particularly its experiences of transcendence, 
to a collective view of the good life”65. However, the growing privatisation 
of religion redefi ned the general framework within which the churches were 
to coexist with other traditions and forms of religious experience. The de-
monopolisation of the production and distribution of world-views results in 
a variety of (new) suppliers on the market of world-views. Somehow, the 
churches are competing with other contemporary constructions of the sacred 
cosmos. The new social forms of religion and morality were superimposed 
upon a mixture of older ones. At the same time, the contents of religion and 
morality have changed signifi cantly66, which makes it diffi cult to interpret the 
results of empirical investigation67. The shift from the great to the intermediate 
and minor transcendences contributes to the development of a nebula of small 
faith stories, more and more disconnected from the big stories administered by 
the traditional institutionalised religions68.
Over time, perceptions and interpretations of what is happening to the religious 
phenomenon in Western Europe are changing. As already mentioned, P. Berger 
is known for his idea of secularisation as a process of social disintegration of 
religious institutions (1967)69. Understood in this sense however, secularisation, 
63 Th. Luckmann, The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, New 
York 1967, Macmillan.
64 D. Hervieux-Léger, Une sociologie des “modernités religieuses multiples”, «Social Compass» 
50 (2003), p. 288.
65 Th. Luckmann, Transformations of Religion and Morality in Modern Europe, op. cit., p. 276, 
italics in original text.
66 Ibid., p. 283.
67 P. Bréchon, L’héritage chrétien de l’Europe occidentale qu’en ont fait les nouvelles 
generations?, «Social Compass» 51 (2004), p. 216.
68 D. Hervieux-Léger, Une sociologie des “modernités religieuses multiples”, op. cit., p. 288.
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as an expulsion of religion, achieved its realisation only within Western Europe 
and Canada, and only in a particular sense70.
Following Berger, Hervieu-Léger also argues in favour of reconsidering the 
secularisation hypothesis71. Although the empirical observation of an ‘objective 
secularisation’, the loss of offi cial religious beliefs and practices, of a feeling 
of being religious, is a matter of fact, the ‘subjective secularisation’, the depth 
attitudes of the individual people and of society, maintains strong ties with the 
original religious background. Secularisation then should include and integrate the 
diversity of confi gurations of religious modernity as they emerged in the different 
European contexts, and should not be associated any more exclusively with the 
idea of the loss or expulsion of religion. The concept of a (Catholic or Protestant) 
‘invisible religion’ seems to be adequate for distinguishing paradoxical processes 
in the European context. Despite the loss of offi cial beliefs and religious practices 
(i.e. objective secularisation) the depth structure of the initial religious socialisation 
remains very strong and still is a tool for encrypting the culture with Catholic, 
Protestant, or Jewish traditions. The symbolic structures of these traditions still 
have a remarkable impact upon culture and the environment, but much less 
in the traditional institutional social forms. Or, as Luckmann puts it: Religion 
and morality are still alive. Religion is not a passing historical phenomenon72. 
Depending upon how one looks at ‘secularisation’, one sees a loss, a radical 
break, or continuity. In turning their back to the institutional forms and norms for 
religious belonging, many people still keep their inbuilt Catholic or Protestant 
eye for perceiving the reality and for organising their interactions with the wider 
society. Catholics and Protestants more often have a similar relationship with 
society and respond more to traditional values than non-religious people.
The reinterpretation seems to be valid for the older generations. What do the 
young generations do with the Christian heritage in Western Europe?73 The issue 
of a European Christian heritage proved to be of great interest (among church 
authorities and political leaders) at the occasion of the redaction of a European 
Constitution, but is it a symptom of strong identifi cation within the Christian 
population at large?
70 P. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, 
Grand Rapids 1999, MI, Eerdmans.
71 D. Hervieu-Léger, Une sociologie des “modernités religieuses multiples”, op. cit., p. 289-
293; see also D. Hervieu-Léger, The Twofold Limit of the Notion of Secularisation, op. cit., p. 
112-125.
72 Th. Luckmann, Transformations of Religion and Morality in Modern Europe, op. cit., p. 
183-184.
73 P. Bréchon, L’héritage chrétien de l’Europe, op. cit., p. 204-206.
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According to Bréchon, the so-called “Christian heritage” is becoming 
something different. The younger generations do not go back to a Christianity 
of the past. What they do with religion is rather a recomposition than a return, 
and refl ects a complex reality. Particularly young people, more than the older 
generations, recompose their religiousframes of reference and religious behaviour 
in sometimes very loose forms, with paradoxical, non-justifi ed or undocumented 
statements, outside the big religious stories and institutional dogmas. Only 
a minority of young people tend to develop a defi ned religious identity, with 
strong consequences for their life attitudes74.
As Beyer states, the (changing) social systems generate institutional priorities. 
A century ago, religious people’s lives were organised according to rituals and 
the fi xed, stable rhythm of liturgical seasons. For people today, the religious 
or other transcendental support does not have the same importance. Modern 
people departed from the ‘Aberglauben’, the ‘fairy tails’, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Hans Jonas, Emmanuel Levinas, and others point out in relationship to the 
devastating impact of the Holocaust. The general assumption now states that we 
are personally responsible for our life options and for the consequences, and not 
the ‘gods’. In modern consumer society, individualism, fashion, the media, and 
virtual communication highlight the extroverted personality. The ‘rationality’ 
behind it disturbs the traditional religious institutional order, rooted in interiority, 
in a modest, inward-looking, and ritualised self-control in view of a transcendent 
world. But the religious quest remains, albeit in different ways, and often looked 
for outside the offi cial boundaries of the traditional religions.
Who then is taking the lead? The ‘rationalities” generated by contemporary 
society infi ltrate into schools and class groups. It is an important matter for 
teachers to recognise the explicit or implicit reasoning behind slogans, life styles, 
communication styles, artefacts, de-constructive responses to what teachers or 
witnesses of the institutional order represent. Plurality and diversity of sensitivities, 
perceptions, understanding, of handling data and insights create a new learning 
situation, the rationality of which is totally alien to the ‘transmission’ teaching 
model aiming at reproduction and uniformity. Teachers of religion are now 
expected to be ‘hermeneutists’, and experts in communication75.
Obviously, Beyer’s, Luckmann’s, and Hervieu-Léger’s observations have 
important implications for interreligious dialogue and learning.
74 Ibid., p. 216.
75 H. Lombaerts, De klas als leergroep. De leerkracht als hermeneut, in: H. Lombaerts, 
B. Roebben (eds.), Godsdienst op school in de branding. Een tussentijdse balans, Deurne 2000, 
Wolters Plantijn, p. 67-80; H. Lombaerts, Godsdienstonderricht als communicatieve gebeurtenis, 
in: Ibid., p. 81-107.
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8. Theological Debates and Interreligious Dialogue
Both the European Enlightenment and the so-called critique of religion 
(Religonskritik) had a deep impact upon the social position of religion in society. 
They also stimulated the emergence of a variety of forms of emancipation for 
the modern person, and initiated new forms of communication and encounters76. 
According to J. Waardenburg, one can distinguish different degrees of 
‘condensation’ of religiousness within the traditional churches or in separate 
religious groups and movements. Some types of religious orientations easily 
share interests, forms of commitment, and solidarity with other religious or 
secular groups, e.g. in supporting an ‘ecumenism of human rights’, or in using 
secular, scientifi c methods for investigation and analysis. Other religious groups 
or institutions are not against integrating themselves into a pluralist environment, 
but continue to follow a well-defi ned proper life. Still other groups and people 
want to defend the full and separate autonomy of religious traditions, despite the 
secular environment. And fi nally, some religious groups focus upon an exclusive, 
puritanical orthodoxy, often in opposition to the secular environment.
These and similar affi nities, and the related theological debates have their 
implications for interreligious dialogue, and consequently for interreligious 
learning. As G. De Schrijver points out, the tension between the ‘inwardness’ 
of religious groups and the commitment for social justice, for example is one of 
the core issues of recent confrontations among theologians and church leaders77. 
In John Milbank, as G. De Schrijver argues, “theology does not stand in need 
of any secular mediation (and social analysis is one of them) since it harbours 
within itself the basic principles that are needed to pass a judgment on all the rest, 
secular matters included”. Hence Milbank’s opposition to the secular discourse, 
to liberation theologies (using social analysis), and to interreligious dialogue, in 
the name of Christian uniqueness, as Christianity does not stand in need of any 
cross-fertilization by other religions (outside the church no salvation)”78. The 
Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, on the contrary, welcomed the secularisation 
movement of the second half of the twentieth century: “‘Secularisation’ is the 
authentic destiny of Christianity (and not it’s abandonment and negation)”79. For 
76 J. Waardenburg, Religionskritik, Aufklärung, Emanzipiering, Begegnung, in: H. R. Schlette 
(ed.), Religionskritik in interkultureller und interreligiöser Sicht, op. cit., p. 196-208.
77 G. De Schrijver, Recent Theological Debates in Europe. Their Impact on Interreligious 
Dialogue, Bangalore 2004, Dharmaram Publications, p. 15.
78 Ibid., p. 101ff.; also, E. Poulat, Notre laïcité publique, op. cit., p. 29-30.
79 G. De Schrijver, Recent Theological Debates in Europe (n. 80), p. 30, quoting G. Vattimo, 
Beyond Interpretation. The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, Cambridge 1997, 
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G. Vattimo, the recent rediscovery of one’s temporality, fi nitude, and mortality has 
a religious character. The involvement with the changes affecting contemporary 
society, with the vicissitudes of life, and with the radical contingency of existence 
puts us in touch with the fi gure of the Son Incarnate. For G. Vattimo, God’s kenosis 
in Christ constitutes the core of the turnover in the present religious orientation. 
The kenotic (God’s self-abasement in Christ) approach to plurality, for example 
opens perspectives for perceiving non-Christian religions in a different light. The 
kenotic event sets us free to perceive the manifold manifestations of God and 
helps us to see the mystical core and the ideals of self-giving of other religions80. 
Following G. Vattimo’s reading of the Christian tradition, De Schrijver is 
convinced that “a deeper understanding of one’s own tradition of kenosis is 
indispensable for awakening a sensitivity to emptiness and ‘letting go’. In this 
appreciation one can even go so far as to engage in a cross-fertilisation by non-
Christian mysticism”81.
Equally for J.-B. Metz, the suffering people, especially those innocent who 
are suffering unjustly, have a unique moral authority82. For J.-B. Metz, it is the 
only authority in which Gods authority becomes manifest to all people and 
gives a universal dimension to the suffering in the world. To be ‘obedient’ to 
the suffering of innocent people precedes even understanding and discourse. 
To put the suffering of others at the core of today’s refl ection then constitutes 
a presupposition for every truth-claim, including that of religions. The offi cial God-
talk should let go of the universal, strong, power-based monotheistic discourse. 
It raises suspicion among the contemporary educated generations. The biblical 
tradition, on the contrary reveals a weak, vulnerable, and empathic monotheistic 
God image the question about how to relate God and human suffering or evil is as 
its core. According to Metz, this paradigm can justly claim a universal meaning 
and value without the risk of being imperial or totalitarian.
In that sense, the direct contact with non-Western cultures and non-Christian 
religions creates the revelatory space where the kenotic ‘return to religion’ (cf. 
Polity Press, p. 51.
80 For J. Dupuis, “religions in themselves are as many ‘gifts of God to all people’”, as 
distinguished from “what they too often become at the hands of human beings, being used as 
ideology justifying unworthy purposes”. J. Depuis, “Christianity and the Religions” Revisited, 
“Louvain Studies” 28 (2003), p. 367.
81 G. De Schrijver, Recent Theological Debates in Europe, op. cit., p. 33.
82 J. B. Metz, Im Eingedenken fremden Leids. Zu einer Basis- und Brückenkategorie der 
christlichen Gottesrede, in: H.R. Schlette, Religionskritik in interkultureller und interreligiöser 
Sicht, op. cit., p. 141-144.
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G. Vattimo) is rediscovered as a new hermeneutic key for making progress in the 
realm of interreligious learning.
But the explicit interest for interreligious dialogue in the Catholic Church only 
came into the picture - again - during the second half of the twentieth century. The 
fi rst initiatives of dialogue gathered together mainly Western European Christians 
and representatives of non-Christian religions trained in the Western world. 
The integration of the Enlightenment and the critique of religion proved to be 
a complex process, which needed time to emerge within religious consciousness. 
Also, the Christian Europeans needed to overcome the exclusive ‘missionary’ 
attitude and deconstruct the multiple ‘constructs’ about non-Christian religions, 
for having access to different theological perceptions of what other religions 
stand for83.
According to J. Dupuis, only after Vatican II does the Catholic Church 
progressively rediscover that God’s Spirit is present in the religious life of 
other religions and works through their traditions, as it does in the Christian 
Churches. Particularly Pope John Paul II developed the vision of the universal 
working of Gods Spirit in non-Christian religions and, in this sense offered 
a strong theological basis for interreligious dialogue, based upon the “mystery of 
unity”84. He organised unprecedented initiatives to implement his conviction in 
a worldwide perspective. The dialogue is, for John Paul II, of a theological and 
christological nature. Christians know, by faith, of the salvation in Christ, while 
the others remain unconscious of Christ as the source of their redemption.
It is only towards the end of the twentieth century, that the North-South 
problematic for example challenged the world religions to cooperate and to 
commit themselves in efforts for mutual understanding and for creating synergies 
not only in the area of social justice, but also at the explicitly religious level. In 
the 21st century, it is obvious that world religions try to develop a more outspoken 
profi le. In the public political debates, ‘religion’ in its diversity is recognised 
as a core dimension of the life of individuals and of societies as an essential 
factor of the identity of people and cultures. Religion is now granted a different 
and determining role in intercultural contacts, in the peace process, and in local 
or international confl icts, and in handling ethical dilemmas, although in certain 
countries, discrimination and persecution of Christians lead to critical situations. 
The more frequently people live open contacts with other religions, the more 
the offi cially recognised heterogeneity of religions will stimulate initiatives to 
83 J. Waardenburg, Religionskritik, op. cit., p. 205-207.
84 J. Dupuis, Der Interreligiöse Dialog als Herousforderung für die christliche Identität, 
„Zietschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft“ 88 (2004), p. 9-10.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 1 (2011) Number 246
enhance self-understanding and intra-religious dialogue. Multi-religious contacts 
will contribute to a more appropriate interpretation of characteristics of religions, 
to strengthen their inner coherence and to deal with the specifi c structures more 
appropriately. More explicit attention is given, also in the media to the images 
religions inherited or constructed. More accurate information often helps to 
deconstruct false images, and to overcome prejudices.
Apart from the discussion about the exclusive, inclusive, pluralist, or inclusive 
pluralist understanding of interreligious dialogue, the question of the personal faith 
involvement of the dialoguing partners, and of the religiosity of the interreligious 
dialogue itself, is a decisive aspect. According to James Heisig85, the “business 
of getting together is neither mere talk about religion, nor mere religious theory, 
but is itself a religious act”86. In order to prevent the interreligious dialogue from 
being pre-evangelisation, J. Heisig prioritises three criteria: 1/ the practice of the 
common sense core attitude of dialogue and self-criticism; 2/ to be sensitive to the 
esteem for people’s submission to the authority of Tradition and for the tenacity 
of one’s beliefs, religion being at the limits of reason; and 3/ to recognise that 
interreligious dialogue is about a mutual conversion; the evolution of one’s own 
symbolic system is enriched and challenged by that of other faiths87.
This implies that the status given to religions in the interreligious dialogue is 
of crucial importance for its ultimate credibility. Where do the partners belong 
in the fi rst place? For J. Heisig, “one’s primary religious allegiance can be the 
point at which religious faiths together open out to responsibility for the world, 
and the secondary allegiance to that concrete set of symbols or revelations within 
which one lives and thinks”88. The mutual conversion then is not about shifting 
to the other’s religious paradise, or making a joint statement, but of “conversion 
through a dialogue to a kind of interreligiosity, a broadening of religious loyalties 
beyond one’s particular affi liation and awakening to the need of mutual support for 
moral praxis”89. The practice of interreligious dialogue, which aims at a personal 
change of the partners involved is not a mere individual matter, but also affects 
the structure of religious institutions.
J. Dupuis insists upon both the inductive and deductive approaches to 
interreligious dialogue: to proceed from the basic experience of religious 
85 Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Japan.
86 J.W. Heisig, Dialogues At One Inch Above The Ground, New York 2003, Herder & Herder, 
p. 128.
87 Ibid., p. 129-133.
88 Ibid., p. 131.
89 Ibid., p. 133.
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plurality to the interpretation, in the light of this reality, of the data of revelation 
and tradition, or to proceed from the Christian tradition to the concrete reality of 
dialogue90. J. Heisig articulates the dialectic interaction between one’s personal 
particular faith tradition, and the changes (conversion) occurring in the space of 
interreligiosity.
According to J. Heisig, with a further articulation of what interreligiosity 
means from the perspective of our Christian tradition, we enter a fi fth phase 
at the beginning of the third millennium. Two thousand years ago, there were 
the teachings of Jesus, with little organisation or uniformity. The second phase 
coincides with the transformation of the teachings of Christ into a systematisation 
of doctrines, practices, and structures, of changing leadership into a hierarchical 
church. In the third phase, Christianity became a mode of civilisation associated 
with the assumption of secular power, characterised by uniformity, orthodoxy and 
standardisation. In the fourth phase, the Christian religion is considered as one 
religion in a multireligious world, and is no longer the religion par excellence. In 
the fi fth phase, the present time, when religious consciousness identifi es itself as 
Christian, but without belonging to a particular ecclesiastical institution, we are 
confronted with the emergence of “Christianness” (Raimon Panikkar)91. Here, J. 
Heisig connects with the numerous sociological observations and with pastoral 
experience when observing “belonging to Christendom, whether in its conservative 
or reformist branches, is not an issue for the majority of Christian believers today”. 
People no longer identify in the fi rst place with the institutional church, which, as 
such, does not mean disinterest or indifference as regards to human and political 
matters or religious quests. He rather interprets it as “disestablished Christianity, 
or disestablished faith”. Tradition and institutions maintain their importance, but 
only selectively, and the criteria for selection are viewed differently92. Alternative 
‘grass-roots’ communities (in Africa and Asia) or liberation theology (in Latin 
America), for example, aim at saving the spirituality of human dignity, which 
J.-B. Metz, G. Vattimo, Ignacio Ellacuria93, and De Schrijver identify as the 
kenotic paradigm of religious commitments. The shift to ‘Christianness’ and 
‘disestablished Christianity’ is partly responsible for theological and institutional 
misunderstandings and confl icts, which affect the potentiality and the limitations 
of interreligious learning. What then are the implications of these different social 
positions of religions in society for IRL?
90 J. Dupuis, “Christianity and the Religions” Revisited, op. cit., p. 364-366.
91 J. Heisig, Dialogues At One Inch Above The Ground, op. cit., p. 171.
92 Ibid., p. 172.
93 G. De Schrijver, Recent Theological Debates in Europe (n. 80), p. 263-338.
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9. Implications for IRL
What is to be learned in interreligious learning? The deepening of the beliefs 
and traditions of one’s own particular religion; what other religions mean (R.E. 
curricula); what Christianness means (Panikkar); religious sensitivity (Willaime); 
interreligiosity (Heisig)? One can assume that for the fi rst two options, the learner 
does not take too many risks. He or she can remain in the safe, protected territory 
of a clearly defi ned religious identity. The other religions can be explored as 
‘other’, distinct from one’s personal commitments. The other three options 
however are situated at the boundary, at the interface. They are dealing, in 
the fi rst place with the ‘fi lm’, which keeps the different religions separate, but 
which, at the same time, allows mutual exchange and interdependent interaction. 
However relevant, the material content of the different creeds, practices and 
traditions are of secondary importance. Traditions keep their importance, but 
only in a selective way (J. Heisig). The historical and geo-political layer hides 
a lot of the original value and meaning of the genius of each one of the religions, 
hinders mutual understanding, and prevents people from trusting their respective 
creative exploration of the mystery of life and God’s mystery. Judith A. Berling 
explains how much the exclusivist attitude among Christians, in the U.S.A., 
made it very diffi cult to introduce the study of other religions into institutions of 
higher education despite the fact the different denominations and cultures were 
represented in the classroom94. It is that layer, which should be looked at, as it 
holds the hermeneutic key for entering into the others ‘temple’. It also holds 
the key for understanding the respective ways of dealing with “the great moral 
challenges posed to us by the megalopolis, the globalisation of poverty, the 
dwindling protection of human rights, and the trashing of as much of the cosmos 
as our civilisation can get its hands on”95. To limit IRL to a mere materialisation 
of religions, to the ‘realia’, would sterilise the whole project of interreligious 
learning. For Berling, in order to avoid this kind of failure, ‘learning religions’ 
should move beyond ‘science’, beyond ‘empathy’, beyond the ‘religious mind’, 
and beyond ‘intercultural stereotypes’96. J. Heisig argued in favour of mutual 
‘conversion’, without proselytising interests, as the main goal for the partners 
involved in interreligious dialogue. Christianness “takes the Christian religion 
not only beyond the walls of ecclesiastical institutions, but beyond the frontiers of 
94 J. A. Berling, Understanding Other World Religions. A Guide for Interreligious Education, 
New York 2004, Orbis Books, p. 7-11.
95 J. Heisig, Dialogues At One Inch Above The Ground, op. cit., p. 184.
96 J. A. Berling, Understanding Other World Religions, op. cit., p. 34-48.
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the primacy of Christ. For the turn from Christianity as a religion to Christianness 
also opens the possibility of those in other religions converting to Christianity 
without forsaking their own primary symbols or even their institutional affi liation. 
Conversely, it opens the possibility of Christians inheriting the religious riches of 
other religions, such as Buddhism and Islam, not as mere ideas, but into their own 
religious consciousness and practice. In short, the transition to Christianness does 
not do away with the Christian mission but alters its nature from a confrontation 
between religions to a synthesis within personal religious consciousness”97.
For IRL to make sense, in view of interreligious dialogue, it should forsake 
its merely ‘functional’ goals (studying and comparing the respective doctrines, 
exploring and adjusting rituals and prayers, etc.). Rather, it needs to cultivate an 
overall climate of gratuity, of disinterest, and of practicing interreligious dialogue 
for its own sake as a religious act. In the fi nal chapter of his book, ‘What time is 
it for Christianity?’ J. Heisig offers very powerful and insightful perspectives for 
introducing a new era as regards to the emergence of an interreligious universe in 
the 21st century98. We need a broad and daring vision for a common inspiration, 
for establishing solid grounds, for welcoming new religions, for cooperation 
among the world religions, and for ‘conversion’.
The interreligious dialogue fi nds its aim in itself: dialogue for its own sake 
among believers of different traditions. Religions themselves ask for mutual 
understanding of their respective search for religious truth. Not understanding the 
other would be the “normal” situation99. In daily life, people aim for a pragmatic 
mutual understanding; they have to live and act together they don’t necessarily 
see any benefi t in deepening the otherness or subjectivity of the other person.
Of course, the mutual settlement among different traditions in a particular 
environment already happened in the past according to the perception and 
understanding, or lack of understanding of the deepest core of the other religions. 
The confrontation with a changing social environment, and the need for further 
mutual adjustments bring to light the historical, and thus changing nature of the 
interreligious dialogue. Hence the major concern of a hermeneutics of interreligious 
communication: to recognise its complexity, to understand its processes, to 
become conscious of the risk of its failure. Philosophical hermeneutics aims for 
a deep understanding of the other’s belief with the recognition of each other’s 
freedom, the discovery of similarities and harmony. The confrontation with 
97 J. Heisig, Dialogues At One Inch Above The Ground, op. cit., p. 173.
98 Ibid., p. 187-215.
99 M. Bongardt (ed.), Vorwort, in: Verstehen an der Grenze. Beiträge zur Hermeneutik 
interkultureller und interreligiöser Kommunikation, Münster 2003, Aschendorf, p. 7ff.
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‘otherness’, however keeps putting the hope for full understanding into question. 
Can ‘otherness’ and strangeness be overcome? Is the hope for interreligious 
dialogue, then an unrealistic dream, an idealistic illusion?100.
Mutual rapprochement has its own limitations, and should avoid fusion 
or illusory unity. The interreligious dialogue requires a specifi c hermeneutic 
approach, based upon a deeper understanding of the personal faith tradition. The 
dialogue is happening at the boundary of different religious, imaginary, cultural 
identities and geo-political territories. The creation of the in-between zone 
guarantees (a limited) success of interreligious understanding. The understanding 
itself is limited101.
What we should pay attention to, then is the much vaster and deeper mutation 
or metamorphosis of the religious interest itself, we should also pay attention 
to the interaction of institutional religions with their social environment. Only 
internationally coordinated initiatives will have the potential to overcome 
intercultural and interreligious stereotypes. Edward W. Said is known for his 
study of orientalism. “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon ontological 
and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) 
‘the Occident’. Thus a very large mass of writers, among who are poets, novelists, 
philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have 
accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for 
elaborate accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ` mind`, destiny, and 
so on”102. Orientalism is the generic term “to describe the Western approach to the 
Orient, the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically 
as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice, the collection of dreams, images, 
and vocabulary available to anyone who has tried to talk about what lies east 
of the dividing line”103. But, similarly, occidentalism expresses comparable 
stereotypes as regards to the Western world. The West is inhuman. Modernity, the 
Enlightenment, colonialism, imperialist Americanism… are all diabolic aspects 
of a world, which is to be loathed and hated. One should not identify these two 
stereotypes with territorial boundaries, though. The two attitudes can occur 
anywhere in the world104.
100 J.A. Berling, Understanding Other World Religions, op. cit., p. 15-17.
101 M. Bongardt, Verstehen an der Grenze, op. cit., p. 16.
102 E. W. Said, Orientalism: A Brief Defi nition,
 http://www.postcolonialweb.org/uk/ishiguro/orientlm.html (11.03.2011).
103 E. W. Said, Orientalism, London, Penguin Books, 1995, p. 73; Cf. also J. Berling, 
Understanding Other World Religions, op. cit., p. 43.
104 I. Buruma, A. Margalit, Occidentalisme. Het Westen in de ogen van zijn vijanden, trans. 
A. Klootwijk, Antwerp, Atlas 2004, p. 7-17.
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Analogously, and historically speaking, what is called ‘indifference’ - in the 
sense of not showing interest because what is offered does not make a difference 
(anymore) - emerges from Christianity itself, when affected by the Enlightenment 
and modernity, by the demographic changes and the neo-liberal orientation of 
contemporary society. The churches are struggling today with problems, which 
cannot be identifi ed simply as atheism, irreligion, non-belief, denial of the social, 
ethical role of religion, denial of the authority of the churches, denial of the 
prophetic role of religions, disappearance of religions, of church buildings, or 
mere religious passivity, or apathy. As some will point out, indifference should 
not be observed among the ‘unfaithful’ Christians alone. The churches are accused 
of being indifferent towards the new sensitivities of people today. Diversity 
or plurality became one of the core conditions of today’s society. Educational 
theorists explored some of the critical aspects of learning in a diverse world. And 
this could be crucial for interreligious learning105.
Confronted with the religious plurality among pupils in schools, religious 
educationalists see “inter-religious learning” as a new paradigm for religious 
learning. In case IRL is aiming at interreligious dialogue and communication, 
the basic understanding of such a communication is to be kept in mind. 
Conversation, reminds M. Wörner relies upon an interfering communality among 
the communicators, according to which the partners accept to be guided freely, 
unconstrained and closely connected, by the theme and by the communication 
process106.
The traditional paradigm of mono-religious education assumes the furthered 
initiation in one particular religious tradition and the deepening of a respective 
religious identity. The institutional context of denominational schools - as it is 
the case for many youngsters in christianised Europe - and the compulsory status 
of the religion class are intended to reinforce not only the ‘believing‘, but also 
the ‘belonging’. The purpose being that children and youngsters remain faithful 
to the tradition of their initial socialisation and own it personally and in this way 
guarantee the continuity of the church. This expectation is coherent with the 
aims and aspirations of a religious tradition. The concept is severely challenged, 
however by the plurality of the religious attitudes and beliefs of the faithful, as the 
sociological inquiries point out. This situation is refl ected in the classroom, among 
105 J. Berling, Understanding Other World Religions, op. cit., p. 17-33, esp. 33.
106 M. H. Wörner, Interreligiöse Verstandigung als Gespräch? Vorüberlegungen zur Hermeneutik 
interreligiöser Kommunikation, in: M. Bongardt (ed.), Verstehen an der Grenze, op. cit., p. 39.
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teachers and students107. Teachers have different concepts of teaching religion 
and working with their students. A systematic investigation reveals a typology 
of four different logics of handling the teaching and learning of religion. Some 
work according to a ‘committed Christian model’, others are more at home with 
a ‘tolerant model’, a third category refl ects a pessimistic ‘discontinuity’ model, 
and a fourth group of teachers aim for an open and constructive ‘cooperation’ 
with their students108. But also the students seem to refl ect a similar diversity 
as regards to their religious attitudes and dealings with religious education in 
schools. Some can be associated with an ‘open pluralistic model’ of attending 
religion classes, others refl ect a ‘closed Christian model’, a third category refers 
to ‘experiences in their family’ for expressing their affi nities with religious 
education, a fourth group goes along with a ‘cooperation model’, and a fi fth group 
identifi es with ‘discontinuity’109. In both cases, the teachers identifi ed as ‘tolerant’ 
and students of the ‘open pluralistic model’ seem to be the closest to openness 
towards interreligious learning.
When taking the institutional context into consideration, some questions are 
to be raised. Is IRL compatible with the agreement between Church and State as 
regards to RE in schools? What is the weight of the sociological observation of 
religious plurality among youngsters in relationship to the right, obligation, or 
mission religious authorities grant themselves for teaching religion in schools? 
Where would IRL belong in the existing institutional (denominational) setting? 
What kind of theological paradigm will receive a convincing consensus for 
supporting IRL? Who eventually has the legal authority to develop its specifi c 
model to set the rules for its pragmatic implementation in the classrooms and to 
act as an IRL teacher?
107 D. Pollefeyt, D. Hutsebaut, H. Lombaerts, M. De Vlieger, A. Dillen, J. Maex, W. Smit, 
Godsdienstonderwijs uitgedaagd. Jongeren en (inter)levensbeschouwelijke vorming in gezin en 
onderwijs, Leuven 2004, Peeters.
108 Ibid., p. 208-215.
109 Ibid., p. 537-543.
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